RECONCILING VOTERS BEHAVIOR WITH LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS
RECONCILING VOTERS BEHAVIOR WITH LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90057-z
复制
发表时间：
1993-01-01
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
LOTT, JR
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DICK, AR;LOTT, JR
本文提供了一个有效的解释，为什么理性的选民同时连任他们的现任者和任期限制投票。我们的解释集中在选民在选择他们的政治代表时所面临的搭便车问题上。即使所有地区都能从更换政治代表中受益，但任何一个地区都会发现，罢免自己的现任者代价高昂，因为现任者长期任职，善于指挥政府的财富转移。任期限制为选民提供了一种协调行动和克服这种搭便车问题的方法。对所有代表的任期加以限制，可确保任何一个地区的代表被免职时，不会以牺牲其他地区的利益为代价。这一论点还解释了为什么政府转移支付的增加会延长土地保有期。随着转移的增加，减少你的代表的相对任期的成本变得更高。
This paper provides an efficiency explanation for why rational voters simultaneously re-elect their incumbents and vote for term limits. Our explanation focuses upon a free-riding problem that voters face in choosing their political representatives. Even when all districts would benefit from replacing their political representatives, any individual district will find it costly to remove its own incumbent whose long tenure in office has made him skilled at directing government wealth transfers. Term limits offer voters a way to coordinate their actions and overcome this free-riding problem. Placing a limit on the tenure of all representatives ensures that no one district will benefit at the expense of other districts when their representative is removed from office. The argument also provides an explanation for why increased government transfers increases the length of tenure. As transfers increase, it becomes more costly to reduce the relative tenure of your representative.