THE SO2 EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM: COST SAVINGS WITHOUT ALLOWANCE TRADES
THE SO2 EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM: COST SAVINGS WITHOUT ALLOWANCE TRADES
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二氧化硫排放交易计划：无需配额交易即可节省成本
DOI：
10.1111/j.1465-7287.1996.tb00615.x
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Burtraw
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Burtraw
1990 年《清洁空气法》修正案第四章允许发电设施进行二氧化硫排放配额交易，开启了基于激励的环境监管的历史性实验。迄今为止，配额交易相对较少。然而，合规成本远低于预期。本文的目的是解决一个明显的悖论——配额交易计划可能不需要（非常）交易才能成功。第四章代表了环境监管方面的两大进步：(i) 向绩效标准迈进；(ii) 正式配额交易。迄今为止，第一步已经足以提高动态效率并实现相对成本效益。
Title IV of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act initiated a historic experiment in incentive‐based environmental regulation by permitting electric generating facilities to trade allowances for emission of sulfur dioxide. To date, relatively little allowance trading has occurred. However, the costs of compliance have been much less than anticipated. The purpose of this paper is to address the apparent paradox—that the allowance trading program may not require (very much) trading in order to be successful. Title IV represented two great steps forward in environmental regulation: (i) a move toward performance standards and (ii) formal allowance trading. The first step has been sufficient to date for improving dynamic efficiency and achieving relative cost‐effectiveness.