Autonomy, Respect, and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Crisis

Autonomy, Respect, and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Crisis
复制标题

DOI:
10.1111/japp.12248
复制
发表时间:
2017-05-01
影响因子:
1.1
通讯作者:
Burch, Matthew
Burch, Matthew
中科院分区:
人文科学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Burch, Matthew

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

《联合国残疾人权利公约》第 12 条第(2)款保障残疾人在生活的各个方面与其他人平等地享有法律行为能力。残疾人权利委员会在其关于第 12 条的一般性意见中声称,这一保障需要废除世界上对心智能力法的主导做法。根据这种做法,当一个人缺乏在关键时间做出特定法律决定的精神能力时,国家授权第三方代表她做出决定。委员会宣布这种替代性决策违反了《公约》对平等法律能力的保障,因此要求以所谓的支持性决策这一所谓非歧视性替代方案取代这种替代性决策。本文认为,我们应该拒绝委员会目前形式的要求,因为支持决策的新方法最有影响力的版本存在严重的概念缺陷,使其不如心理能力方法。然而,我随后认为,委员会的要求源于对尊重和平等的合理道德关注,这应该体现在《残疾人权利公约》的实施过程中。
Article 12(2) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities guarantees persons with disabilities the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.' In its General Comment on Article 12, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities claims that this guarantee necessitates the abolition of the world's dominant approach to mental capacity law. According to this approach, when a person lacks the mental capacity to make a particular legal decision at the material time, the state authorises a third-party to make it on her behalf. The Committee declares such substituted decision-making a violation of the Convention's guarantee of legal capacity on an equal basis, and therefore demands it be replaced by an allegedly non-discriminatory alternative called supported decision-making. This article argues that we should reject the Committee's demand in its current form, because the most influential version of the new approach to supported decision-making suffers from serious conceptual flaws that make it inferior to the mental capacity approach. However, I then argue that the Committee's demand stems from a legitimate ethical concern with respect and equality that ought to inform the CRPD's implementation process.