Social dilemma structure hidden behind traffic flow with route selection
Social dilemma structure hidden behind traffic flow with route selection
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DOI：
10.1016/j.physa.2016.04.023
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发表时间：
2016-10
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
J. Tanimoto;Kousuke Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Tanimoto;Kousuke Nakamura
一些交通流包含社会困境结构。在这里，我们使用与进化博弈论相吻合的元胞自动机模拟探索了路线选择问题。在我们的模型中，两类驾驶员代理共存：D 代理（缺陷策略），它参考交通信息来选择路线以快速移动；C 代理（合作策略），对信息不敏感，不太倾向于快速移动。虽然没有证据表明低密度的社会困境结构会导致车辆自由移动，而高密度的社会困境结构会导致交通拥堵，但如果提供的交通信息不合适，我们发现了一个对应于n人（多人）吃鸡（n-Chicken）游戏的结构。如果向智能体提供适当的交通信息，n-Chicken 博弈就可以解决。在开发支持智能交通系统（ITS）的技术时，传递给车辆的信息对于缓解城市交通拥堵造成的社会困境至关重要。
Several traffic flows contain social dilemma structures. Herein, we explored a route-selection problem using a cellular automaton simulation dovetailed with evolutionary game theory. In our model, two classes of driver-agents coexist: D agents (defective strategy), which refer to traffic information for route selection to move fast, and C agents (cooperative strategy), which are insensitive to information and less inclined to move fast. Although no evidence suggests that the social dilemma structure in low density causes vehicles to move freely and that in high density causes traffic jams, we found a structure that corresponds to an n-person (multiplayer) Chicken (n-Chicken) game if the provided traffic information is inappropriate. If appropriate traffic information is given to the agents, the n-Chicken game can be solved. The information delivered to vehicles is crucial for easing the social dilemma due to urban traffic congestion when developing technologies to support the intelligent transportation system (ITS).