Executive Compensation in the Life Insurance Industry
Executive Compensation in the Life Insurance Industry
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DOI：
10.1086/296557
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发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Mayers;Clifford W. Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Mayers;Clifford W. Smith
另类理论暗示互助保险公司和股票保险公司高管之间的薪酬水平存在差异。来自寿险行业的证据表明：（1）互助高管的薪酬低于股票高管的薪酬；（2）互助子公司高管的薪酬低于股票子公司高管的薪酬；（3）互助高管的薪酬对公司业绩的影响不如股票高管。这一证据与公司投资机会集的存在差异以及相互寿险公司和股票寿险公司之间所需管理自由裁量权的差异是一致的。版权所有 1992 芝加哥大学出版社。
Alternative theories imply differential compensation levels between executives of mutual and stock insurance companies. Evidence from the life insurance industry indicates (1) the compensation of mutual executives is lower than that of stock executives, (2) the compensation of mutual-subsidiary executives is lower than that of stock-subsidiary executives, and (3) the compensation of mutual executives is less responsive to firm performance than that of stock executives. This evidence is consistent with the existence of differences in corporate investment opportunity sets and resulting differences in required managerial discretion between mutual and stock life insurance companies. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.