Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
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选择性披露和内幕交易
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Michael D. Guttentag
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作者：
Michael D. Guttentag
确定何时选择性披露重大非公开信息应引发内幕交易责任是内幕交易原则中一个严重问题的方面。
目前的规则是，只有“内幕人士（进行选择性披露）个人将直接或间接地从其披露中受益”，选择性披露才会引发内幕交易责任。 Dirks v. SEC 于 1983 年引入了这种“个人利益”测试，以平衡确定内幕交易何时应引发内幕交易责任的四个相互竞争的理由。自德克斯以来的两个发展使个人福利测试出现了难以克服的问题。首先，美国证券交易委员会于 2000 年颁布的《公平披露条例》取代了联邦普通法对上市公司选择性披露的规定，更明确的是，禁止上市公司向华尔街分析师进行德克斯个人利益测试旨在保护的选择性披露类型。其次，在美国诉奥哈根案中，最高法院采用了挪用理论，极大地扩展了可能引发内幕交易责任的欺骗行为类型。
在 FD 和 O’Hagan 法规之后，只有直接基于针对欺骗行为的法定禁令来测试选择性披露何时触发内幕交易责任才有意义。获得个人利益应该是认定选择性披露具有足够欺骗性从而引发内幕交易责任的充分但非必要条件。
Determining when the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information should trigger insider trading liability is a deeply problematic aspect of insider trading doctrine.
The current rule is that a selective disclosure can only trigger insider trading liability if “the insider [making the selective disclosure] personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” Dirks v. SEC introduced this “personal benefit” test in 1983 to balance four competing rationales for determining when a tip should trigger insider trading liability. Two developments since Dirks have made problems with this personal benefit test insurmountable. First, the SEC’s enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 supplanted federal common law regulation of selective disclosures by public companies and, more pointedly, prohibited public companies from making precisely the types of selective disclosures to Wall Street analysts that the Dirks personal benefit test was designed to protect. Second, in United States v. O’Hagan the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory, which greatly expanded the types of deceptive conduct that could trigger insider trading liability.
After Regulation FD and O’Hagan, only a test for when a selective disclosure triggers insider trading liability based directly on the statutory prohibition against deceptive conduct makes sense. Receipt of a personal benefit should be a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for finding that a selective disclosure is deceptive enough to trigger insider trading liability.