Interdependent Security With Strategic Agents and Cascades of Infection
Interdependent Security With Strategic Agents and Cascades of Infection
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战略代理和级联感染的相互依赖的安全
DOI：
10.1109/tnet.2015.2408598
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. La
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. La
我们调查级联的网络组成的战略代理相互依赖的安全。我们假设战略代理人可以在（i）投资以保护自己，（ii）购买保险以转移（一些）风险和（iii）不采取行动之间做出选择。使用人口博弈模型，我们研究了各种系统参数，如节点度，感染传播速率，以及感染的节点将感染传播到邻居的概率，如何影响节点在纳什均衡的选择和由此产生的无政府状态/稳定的代价。此外，我们研究了一个单一的感染节点可以传播感染到整个网络的一个重要部分，称为级联概率的概率，行为相对于系统参数。特别是，我们证明，至少对于某些参数制度，级联概率增加的平均度的节点。
We investigate cascades in networks consisting of strategic agents with interdependent security. We assume that the strategic agents have choices between (i) investing in protecting themselves, (ii) purchasing insurance to transfer (some) risks, and (iii) taking no actions. Using a population game model, we study how various system parameters, such as node degrees, infection propagation rate, and the probability with which infected nodes transmit infection to neighbors, affect nodes' choices at Nash equilibria and the resultant price of anarchy/stability. In addition, we examine how the probability that a single infected node can spread the infection to a significant portion of the entire network, called cascade probability, behaves with respect to system parameters. In particular, we demonstrate that, at least for some parameter regimes, the cascade probability increases with the average degree of nodes.