An Economic Analysis of the Fisheries Bycatch Problem
An Economic Analysis of the Fisheries Bycatch Problem
复制标题
渔业兼捕问题的经济分析
DOI：
10.1006/jeem.1996.0047
复制
发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
J. Boyce
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Boyce
摘要兼捕是对其他群体有价值的物种的偶然捕获。本文比较了开放获取和个人可转让配额均衡与渔业联合价值最大化的均衡。只有当目标物种和兼捕物种都有可交易的配额，并且兼捕物种不具有生存价值时，开放获取引起的问题才能通过单独的可转让配额制度得到纠正。存在一系列的兼捕到目标物种的收获水平，其中每一种的总收获将完全由给定的技术，即使在开放获取。然而，甚至可能不存在一个唯一的开放获取均衡，如果副渔获物分配的“捕获规则”。禁止兼捕物的销售降低了兼捕物的水平，但也降低了社会福利。
Abstract Bycatch is the incidental take of a species that has value to some other group. This paper compares open access and individual transferable quota equilibria to the equilibrium in which the joint value of the fisheries is maximized. The open access induced problems can be corrected by an individual transferable quota system only if both the target species and the bycatch species have tradable quotas, and only if the bycatch species does not have existence value. There exists a range of the bycatch-to-target species harvest levels for which the total harvest of each will be exactly taken by a given technology, even under open access. However, there may not even exist a unique open access equilibrium if bycatch is allocated by “rule of capture.” Prohibitions on the sale of bycatch reduce the bycatch level, but they also reduce social welfare.