A note on a generalization of the nucleolus to games without sidepayments
A note on a generalization of the nucleolus to games without sidepayments
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关于将核仁推广到没有侧支付的游戏的说明
DOI：
10.1007/bf01774301
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发表时间：
1983
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
M. Nakayama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Nakayama
我们提出了一个概括的核仁游戏没有侧付款。通过允许人际效用比较，使得收益与给定的权重成比例地确定，我们将联盟的超额定义为依赖于该权重向量的数，证明了联盟的存在性和包含在非空核中，但不保持唯一性。还应指出，这里定义的过剩与Kalai [1975]定义的过剩不同。
We present a generalization of the nucleolus to games without sidepayments. By allowing the interpersonal utility comparison such that payoffs are determined proportionally to given weights, we define an excess of a coalition as a number depending on this vector of weights.The existence and the inclusion in nonempty cores are proved, but the uniqueness is not preserved. It is also remarked that the excess defined here is not the same as that ofKalai[1975]