Endogenous Leadership in Tax Competition: A Combination of the Effects of Market Power and Strategic Interaction
Endogenous Leadership in Tax Competition: A Combination of the Effects of Market Power and Strategic Interaction
复制标题
税收竞争中的内生领导力：市场力量与战略互动的结合
DOI：
10.1515/bejeap-2016-0191
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Xuyang Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jiancai Pi;Xuyang Chen
摘要本文对Kempf和Rota-Graziosi(2010)的“税收竞争中的内生性领导”一书进行了扩展。《公共经济学杂志》94(9)：768-776)和Hindriks和Nishimura(2015)，《关于税收竞争模型中均衡领导力的说明》。公共经济学杂志121：66-68)，通过联合考虑市场力量和税收竞争中的战略互动的影响。我们将区域不对称性描述为资本需求逆需求的不同斜率和不同的垂直截距。在我们的设置中，恢复了由大区域主导的风险主导均衡。此外，与Kempf和Rota-Graziosi(2010)不同，“税收竞争中的内生性领导”。《公共经济学杂志》94(9)：768-776)和Hindriks和Nishimura(2015)，《关于税收竞争模型中均衡领导力的说明》。公共经济学杂志121：66-68)，我们表明，在大市场需求和低资本禀赋的情况下，即使不对称程度很小，大地区的领导仍然可以是帕累托主导的。
Abstract This paper extends Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010, “Endogenizing Leadership in Tax Competition.” Journal of Public Economics 94 (9):768–776) and Hindriks and Nishimura (2015, “A Note on Equilibrium Leadership in Tax Competition Models.” Journal of Public Economics 121:66–68) by jointly considering the effects of market power and strategic interaction in tax competition. We depict the regional asymmetry as different slopes and different vertical intercepts of the inverse demand for capital. In our setup, the risk-dominant equilibrium in which the large region leads is regained. Moreover, dissimilar to Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010, “Endogenizing Leadership in Tax Competition.” Journal of Public Economics 94 (9):768–776) and Hindriks and Nishimura (2015, “A Note on Equilibrium Leadership in Tax Competition Models.” Journal of Public Economics 121:66–68), we show that with a large market demand and a low capital endowment, the leadership by the large region can still be Pareto-dominant even if the asymmetry is very small.