How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically?

How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically?
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分类器如何引导智能体进行战略性投入?

DOI:
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发表时间:
2018
期刊:
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Manish Raghavan
Manish Raghavan
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
J. Kleinberg;Manish Raghavan

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算法通常用于制定对个人进行分类或评估个人的决策规则。当这些人有激励措施以某种方式分类时,他们可能会在战略上行事来影响其结果。我们开发了一个模型,说明战略代理如何投入努力以改变他们获得的结果,并对何时激励这种代理人进行投资以投资指定形式的努力来改善其成果,而不是“游戏”而不是“游戏”分类器。我们表明,只要任何“合理”机制都可以这样做,那么简单的线性机制就足够了。
Algorithms are often used to produce decision-making rules that classify or evaluate individuals. When these individuals have incentives to be classified a certain way, they may behave strategically to influence their outcomes. We develop a model for how strategic agents can invest effort in order to change the outcomes they receive, and we give a tight characterization of when such agents can be incentivized to invest specified forms of effort into improving their outcomes as opposed to "gaming" the classifier. We show that whenever any "reasonable" mechanism can do so, a simple linear mechanism suffices.
DOI: 10.1145/2020408.2020495
发表时间: 2011-08
期刊: --
影响因子: --
作者:
Michael Brückner;T. Scheffer
通讯作者: Michael Brückner;T. Scheffer
DOI: --
发表时间: 2019
期刊: In Proceedings of ACM FAT*
影响因子: --
作者:
Milli, Smitha;Miller, John;Dragan, Anca;Hardt, Moritz
通讯作者: Hardt, Moritz