Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability and Interoperability
Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability and Interoperability
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DOI:
10.14722/ndss.2019.23330
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发表时间:
2019
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通讯作者:
Giulio Malavolta;Pedro A. Moreno-Sánchez;Clara Schneidewind;Aniket Kate;Matteo Maffei
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作者:
Giulio Malavolta;Pedro A. Moreno-Sánchez;Clara Schneidewind;Aniket Kate;Matteo Maffei
—Tremendous growth in cryptocurrency usage is exposing the inherent scalability issues with permis-sionless blockchain technology. Payment-channel networks (PCNs) have emerged as the most widely deployed solution to mitigate the scalability issues, allowing the bulk of payments between two users to be carried out off-chain. Unfortunately, as reported in the literature and further demonstrated in this paper, current PCNs do not provide meaningful security and privacy guarantees [30], [40]. In this work, we study and design secure and privacy-preserving PCNs. We start with a security analysis of existing PCNs, reporting a new attack that applies to all major PCNs, including the Lightning Network, and allows an attacker to steal the fees from honest intermediaries in the same payment path. We then formally define anonymous multi-hop locks (AMHLs), a novel cryptographic primitive that serves as a cornerstone for the design of secure and privacy-preserving PCNs. We present several provably secure cryptographic instantiations that make AMHLs compatible with the vast majority of cryptocurrencies. In particular, we show that (linear) homomorphic one-way functions suffice to construct AMHLs for PCNs supporting a script language (e.g., Ethereum). We also propose a construction based on ECDSA signatures that does not require scripts , thus solving a prominent open problem in the field.