Incentive mechanisms for priority queuing problems
Incentive mechanisms for priority queuing problems
复制标题
优先级排队问题的激励机制
DOI：
10.2307/3003591
复制
发表时间：
1978
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Dolan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Dolan
我们认为，发展的激励机制，诱导用户的服务设施，以揭示参数的系统管理员需要确定的最佳序列的服务排队用户。我们首先考虑使用最近建议的公共产品的税收程序，然后开发一个更有效的机制的基础上边际延迟成本。我们证明，设置服务的优先级价格等于边际延迟成本强加给别人的结构的情况下，用户最大化他的个人福利，揭示他的真实延迟成本。
We consider the development of an incentive mechanism to induce users of a service facility to reveal the parameters the system administrator requires to determine the optimal sequence of service to queued users. We first consider using the taxation procedure recently suggested for public goods, and then develop a more efficient mechanism based on marginal delay costs. We prove that setting the priority price for service equal to the marginal delay cost imposed on others structures a situation such that a user maximizes his individual welfare revealing his true delay cost.