The Provision of Public Universal Health Insurance : Impacts on Private Insurance, Asset Holdings and Welfare
The Provision of Public Universal Health Insurance : Impacts on Private Insurance, Asset Holdings and Welfare
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公共全民健康保险的提供：对私人保险、资产持有和福利的影响
DOI：
10.1017/s1365100512000065
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Minchung Hsu and Junsang Lee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Natsuda Kaoru;Thoburn John;Minchung Hsu and Junsang Lee
本文旨在研究在家庭异质性和金融市场不完全的环境下，公共提供全民健康保险（UHI）的影响。各种城市热岛政策与扭曲和非扭曲的融资方法进行了比较，以解决风险降低和税收扭曲之间的权衡，以及相应的福利影响。我们使用一个包含内生保险选择和劳动力供给决策的动态均衡模型进行定量分析。结果表明，城市卫生保健支出覆盖率过高，在大多数经合组织国家时，扭曲效应的考虑。我们发现一个明显的挤出效应的资产持有。私人健康保险（PHI）购买的影响时，城市热岛效应的介绍取决于定价和设计的覆盖面。研究发现，富人对公共卫生设施价格较为敏感，在城市公共卫生设施引入后，他们更倾向于制定一个补充计划。
This paper aims to investigate impacts of public provision of universal health insurance (UHI) in an environment with household heterogeneity and financial market incompleteness. Various UHI polices with both distortionary and nondistortionary financing methods are compared to address the trade-off between risk reduction and tax distortion, as well as the corresponding welfare implications. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with endogenous insurance choice and labor supply decisions to perform quantitative analysis. The results suggest that the UHI expenditure coverage rate is too high in most OECD countries when the distortion effect is considered. We find a clear crowding-out effect on asset holdings. Implications for private health insurance (PHI) purchases when UHI is introduced depend on the pricing and the design of coverage. We find that the rich are sensitive to the price of PHI, and would prefer a supplemental plan when UHI is introduced.