The Time-Consistent Public Goods Provision
The Time-Consistent Public Goods Provision
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时间一致的公共产品供给
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12209
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Shigeo Morita
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shigeo Morita
本文从承诺问题的角度重新考虑了具有公共物品的最优非线性税收问题，并考察了它对公共物品供给条件的影响。我们表明，萨缪尔森规则应修改时，政府不能承诺和纳税人的技能类型被揭露。即使纳税人有相同的偏好，这是可分离的和附加的消费和休闲，萨缪尔森规则打破。我们的分析重点是承诺问题对公共资金边际成本和公共产品提供水平的影响。我们的研究结果意味着，在公共产品的投资水平可能是过度的情况下，不考虑承诺的问题。
In this study, we reconsider the optimal non-linear tax problem with the public goods from the perspective of the commitment issue and examine how it affects the condition of the public goods provision. We show that the Samuelson rule should be modified when the government cannot commit and the skill types of taxpayers are revealed. Even if taxpayers have the same preference, which is separable and additive with respect to consumption and leisure, the Samuelson rule breaks down. Our analysis focuses on the effect of commitment issue on the marginal cost of public funds and the level of public goods provision. Our findings imply that the level of investment in public goods may be excessive in comparison to the case where the commitment issue is not considered.