Borrowing Requirements, Credit Access, and Adverse Selection: Evidence from Kenya
Borrowing Requirements, Credit Access, and Adverse Selection: Evidence from Kenya
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借款要求、信贷准入和逆向选择：来自肯尼亚的证据
DOI：
10.3386/w22686
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Suri
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Jack;M. Kremer;Joost de Laat;T. Suri
我们研究了低收入国家信贷市场中资产抵押贷款的潜力。当肯尼亚一家乳制品合作社用资产本身（一个大型水箱）抵押的贷款取代高额首付和连带责任要求时，贷款吸收率从 2.4% 增加到 41.9%。相比之下，用连带责任要求代替存款要求对贷款吸收没有影响。允许抵押 75% 贷款的农户中没有收回财产，而提供 96% 资产抵押的农户中，收回率为 0.7%。基于事后放弃借款要求的卡兰-津曼测试发现了存款要求非常低的逆向选择证据，但没有道德风险。一个简单的模型和粗略的校准表明，逆向选择和利率监管上限可能会阻止贷款人以低存款要求发放改善福利的贷款。我们估计2/3的边际贷款导致了蓄水投资的增加。放宽借贷要求的实际影响包括增加家庭用水机会、减少儿童花在与水相关的任务上的时间以及提高女童入学率。
We examine the potential of asset-collateralized loans in low-income country credit markets. When a Kenyan dairy cooperative exogenously replaced high down payments and joint liability requirements with loans collateralized by the asset itself - a large water tank - loan take-up increased from 2.4% to 41.9%. In contrast, substituting joint liability requirements for deposit requirements had no impact on loan take up. There were no repossessions among farmers allowed to collateralize 75% of their loans, and a 0.7% repossession rate among those offered 96% asset collateralization. A Karlan-Zinman test based on waiving borrowing requirements ex post finds evidence of adverse selection with very low deposit requirements, but not of moral hazard. A simple model and rough calibration suggests that adverse selection and regulatory caps on interest rates may deter lenders from making welfare-improving loans with low deposit requirements. We estimate that 2/3 of marginal loans led to increased water storage investment. Real effects of loosening borrowing requirements include increased household water access, reductions in child time spent on water-related tasks, and greater school enrollment forr girls.