Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts
Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts
复制标题
认知概念是否可以还原为伦理概念
DOI：
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发表时间：
1978
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Firth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Firth
当讨论知识理论中的问题时，我们经常发现自己使用了具有道德特征的术语。我们可能会问，区分好的假设或解释和坏的假设或解释的是什么。我们可以肯定或否认，有时仅仅简单就能使一种假设优于另一种假设。我们可以说，我们应该相信我们的记忆，只要它们彼此一致。我们可能会决定对理论实体的这种或那种推论是允许的。我们可能想知道，如果我们知道一个同样合理但不相容的替代理论，我们是否有权接受一个理论。等等。这类事实表明，认识论问题是伦理问题的一种，并且认识论概念在任何程度上都可以还原为伦理概念。
When discussing problems in theory of knowledge we often find ourselves using a terminology that is characteristically ethical. We may ask what it is that distinguishes a good hypothesis or explanation from a bad one. We may affirm or deny that mere simplicity can sometimes make one hypothesis preferable to another. We may say that we ought to trust our memories to the extent that they cohere with one another. We may decide that this or that kind of inference to theoretical entities ispermissible. We may wonder if we could ever have the right to accept a theory if we knew of an equally plausible, but incompatible, alternative. And so forth. Facts of this kind suggest that epistemological questions are a species of ethical questions, and that epistemic concepts are reducible to ethical concepts to whatever extent this entails.