Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes : Evidence from German Administrative Data ∗

Wage Rigidity and Employment Outcomes : Evidence from German Administrative Data ∗
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工资刚性和就业结果:来自德国行政数据的证据*

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发表时间:
2014
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通讯作者:
Gabriel Ehrlich
Gabriel Ehrlich
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作者:
Gabriel Ehrlich

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本文使用来自德国的新型关联雇主-雇员数据集检验了名义工资刚性下降与就业结果之间的关系。估计显示,工资刚性阻止了24.5%的反事实工资削减,各企业的标准差为23.5%。相对于没有测量工资刚性的企业,具有平均水平的工资刚性的企业预计裁员率增加0.7个百分点,离职率减少1.8个百分点,雇用率减少1.3个百分点。这些关联与结构模型的预测是一致的。一个反事实的政策模拟表明,即使名义工资削减成本高昂,通胀也可以通过促进真实的工资削减来“润滑”劳动力市场的车轮。JEL代码:E2,E24,E50,J23,J31,J63你们说:“我们从反复的经验知道,劳动的货币价格,在许多工人失业一段时间以前,是不会福尔斯下落的。”我不知道这回事而且,如果工资以前是高的,我看不出有什么理由在许多工人失业之前不降低工资。我认为,所有的一般推理都支持我对这个问题的看法,因为为什么有些人同意不拿任何工资,而另一些人却得到了最丰厚的报酬呢?大卫李嘉图致托马斯马尔萨斯的信,1821年
This paper examines the relationship between downward nominal wage rigidity and employment outcomes using a novel linked employer-employee dataset from Germany. The estimates suggest wage rigidity prevents 24.5 percent of counterfactual wage cuts, with a standard deviation of 23.5 percent across establishments. An establishment with the average level of wage rigidity is predicted to have a 0.7 percentage point increase in the layoff rate, a 1.8 percentage point reduction in the quit rate, and a 1.3 percentage point reduction in the hire rate relative to an establishment with no measured wage rigidity. These associations are consistent with the predictions of a structural model. A counterfactual policy simulation suggests that inflation can “grease the wheels” of the labor market by facilitating real wage cuts even when nominal wage cuts are costly to achieve. JEL Codes: E2, E24, E50, J23, J31, J63 You say, ‘We know from repeated experience that the money price of labour never falls till many workmen have been for some time out of work.’ I know no such thing; and, if wages were previously high, I can see no reason whatever why they should not fall before many labourers are thrown out of work. All general reasoning, I apprehend, is in favour of my view of this question, for why should some agree to go without any wages while others were most liberally rewarded? Letter of David Ricardo to Thomas Malthus, 1821