An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis
An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis
复制标题
公共物品挤出假说的实验检验
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Andreoni
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Andreoni
本文对一次性征税的政府对公共产品的贡献将完全排挤自愿贡献这一命题进行了实验检验。研究发现，挤出是不完全的，被征税的受试者明显更具合作性。这是正确的，即使税收不影响纳什均衡预测。这一结果被作为替代模型的证据，这些模型假设人们从对公共产品的贡献中获得一些私人利益。版权所有1993年，由美国经济协会。
This paper presents an experimental test of the proposition that government contributions to public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, will completely crowd out voluntary contributions. It is found that crowding-out is incomplete and that subjects who are taxed are significantly more cooperative. This is true even though the tax does not affect the Nash equilibrium prediction. This result is taken as evidence for alternative models that assume people experience some private benefit from contributing to public goods. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.