Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions
Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions
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可能世界中的身份：一些问题
DOI：
10.2307/2214708
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发表时间：
1967
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Chisholm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Chisholm
在一篇关于欣蒂卡的知识和信仰的文章中，我提出，当我们考虑一个可能世界中的个体可能与另一个可能世界中的个体相同时，某些困难的问题就会浮现在脑海中。那么，让我们假设，无限可能世界的图形是有意义的，为了表述的简单，让我们也假设，我们对这个世界有一个完整的描述。我们可以考虑这个世界的某个实体，稍微改变一下它的描述。调整对世界上其他实体的描述，以适应这种变化，然后问自己，我们这样到达的可能世界中的实体是否与我们在这个世界中开始的实体相同。我们从亚当开始，说;我们稍微改变他的描述，让他活了931年，而不是只有930年;然后我们适应我们的生活。
In an article on Hintikka's Knowledge and Belief, I suggested that certain difficult questions come to mind when we consider the thought that an individual in one possible world might be identical with an individual in another possible world.2 The present paper is written in response to the editor's invitation to be more explicit about these questions. Let us suppose, then, that the figure of an infinity of possible worlds makes good sense and let us also suppose, for simplicity of presentation, that we have a complete description of this one. We may consider some one of the entities of this world, alter its description slightly. adjust the descriptions of the other entities in the world to fit this alteration, and then ask ourselves whether the entity in the possible world that we thus arrive at is identical with the entity we started with in this world. We start with Adam, say; we alter his description slightly and allow him to live for 931 years instead of for only 930; we then accomodate our