The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives
The hidden cost of direct democracy: How ballot initiatives affect politicians’ selection and incentives
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直接民主的隐性成本：投票倡议如何影响政治家的选择和激励
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Bruno H. Strulovici
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Carlo G. Prato;Bruno H. Strulovici
公民倡议和公投在现代民主国家中发挥着重要作用，从欧盟条约的批准到加利福尼亚州的同性婚姻，再到瑞士对外国工人的控制。与直接民主和代议制民主之间的经典对立不同，我们研究直接民主制度对民选官员的激励和选拔的均衡效应。我们发现，促进直接民主会导致政客的角色和对社会的贡献呈恶性循环，这可能会主导任何直接利益。该理论提供了对连任概率和政客表现的预测，与美国各州最近的证据一致。
Citizen initiatives and referendums play an important role in modern democracies, from treaty ratifications in the European Union to gay marriage in California, to the control of foreign workers in Switzerland. Departing from the classic opposition between direct and representative democracy, we study the equilibrium effects of direct democracy institutions on the incentives and selection of elected officials. We find that facilitating direct democracy induces a negative spiral on politicians’ role and contribution to society, which may dominate any direct benefit. The theory offers predictions on reelection probabilities and politicians’ performance consistent with recent evidence from the US states.