Political Manipulation in a Majoritarian Democracy: Central Government Targeting of Public Funds to English Subnational Government, in Space and across Time
Political Manipulation in a Majoritarian Democracy: Central Government Targeting of Public Funds to English Subnational Government, in Space and across Time
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多数民主制中的政治操纵：中央政府在空间和时间上将公共资金瞄准英国地方政府
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Hugh Ward
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. John;Hugh Ward
本文认为，这是合理的行政目标资源的空间和时间，如果它试图最大限度地提高其选举成功的机会。在联合王国等多数民主国家，有特别强烈的动机将资源用于边缘立法选区，尽管其他政治制度也存在类似的机会。这种做法的好处可能越来越大，因为政治商业周期理论所预测的时间目标形式的成本由于全球经济的影响而增加。在联合王国，中央政府向地方当局提供赠款是确定资源目标的一个渠道。这个模型进行了测试与汇集横截面数据的中央财政的英国地方政府在1981/1982-1995/1996年。文章证实，中央政府在1988/1989年后的空间目标边缘化，而它继续分配更多的资金接近全国选举，有条件的民意调查评级。从文献中的假设分配政治也进行了测试，找到证据的时间分配的资源，以赢得地方选举。
This article argues that it is rational for the executive to target resources in space and through time if it seeks to maximise its chances of electoral success. In majoritarian democracies such as the United Kingdom, there are particularly strong incentives to target resources to marginal legislative constituencies, although similar opportunies exist in other political systems. The benefits of such a practice could be growing, because the costs of forms of temporal targeting predicted by theories of the political business cycle have increased, owing to the effect of the global economy. In the United Kingdom one channel through which resources can be targeted is central grants to local authorities. This model is tested with pooled cross section data on the central finance of English local government between 1981/1982–1995/1996. The article confirms that central government spatially targeted marginals after 1988/1989 while it continued to allocate greater funds near national elections, conditional on its opinion poll ratings. Hypotheses from the literature on distributional politics are also tested, finding evidence for the temporal allocation of resources to win local elections.