A scalable and automatic mechanism for resource allocation in self-organizing cloud
A scalable and automatic mechanism for resource allocation in self-organizing cloud
复制标题
自组织云中资源分配的可扩展且自动的机制
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Shui Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xiaotong Wu;Meng Liu;Wanchun Dou;Longxiang Gao;Shui Yu
自组织云利用了消费者尚未开发的计算能力的巨大潜力，是一种新颖的计算范例，其中消费者能够贡献/出售他们的计算资源。同时，消费者持有的主机通过互联网上的对等（P2P）覆盖网络连接。在这种新的体系结构中，由于大量的和变化的资源和价格，这是低效和繁琐的消费者手动选择适当的资源。因此，对于可扩展的和自动的机制来完成资源分配存在很高的需求。针对这一挑战，本文提出了两种基于机制设计的新经济策略。具体地说，我们采用修正的Vickrey拍卖（MVA）机制的情况下，资源是足够的，和连续双向拍卖（CDA）机制时，资源不足。我们还证明了上述机制具有显性策略激励相容性。最后，大量的实验结果进行了验证，所提出的策略的性能方面的采购成本和执行效率。
Taking advantage of the huge potential of consumers’ untapped computing power, self-organizing cloud is a novel computing paradigm where the consumers are able to contribute/sell their computing resources. Meanwhile, host machines held by the consumers are connected by a peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay network on the Internet. In this new architecture, due to large and varying multitudes of resources and prices, it is inefficient and tedious for consumers to select the proper resource manually. Thus, there is a high demand for a scalable and automatic mechanism to accomplish resource allocation. In view of this challenge, this paper proposes two novel economic strategies based on mechanism design. Concretely, we apply the Modified Vickrey Auction (MVA) mechanism to the case where the resource is sufficient; and the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism is employed when the resource is insufficient. We also prove that aforementioned mechanisms have dominant strategy incentive compatibility. Finally, extensive experiment results are conducted to verify the performance of the proposed strategies in terms of procurement cost and execution efficiency.
DOI：
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发表时间：
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期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
R. Buyya;Shin Chee;Yeo;S. Venugopal;J. Broberg;I. Brandić
通讯作者：
R. Buyya;Shin Chee;Yeo;S. Venugopal;J. Broberg;I. Brandić