An Analysis of Decision under Risk in Rats
An Analysis of Decision under Risk in Rats
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.cub.2019.05.013
复制
发表时间：
2019-06-17
期刊：
影响因子：
9.2
通讯作者：
Brody, Carlos D.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Constantinople, Christine M.;Piet, Alex T.;Brody, Carlos D.
1979年，Daniel Kahneman和Amos Tversky发表了一篇开创性的论文，题为《前景理论：风险下的决策分析》，其中提出了一种行为经济学理论，解释了人类如何偏离经济学家的标准主力模型-预期效用理论[1，2]。例如，人们表现出概率扭曲(他们高估了低概率)、损失厌恶(损失大于收益)和参考依赖(结果被评估为相对于内部参考点的收益或损失)。我们发现，在一项让老鼠在保证奖励和概率奖励之间做出选择的任务中，老鼠表现出了许多相同的偏见。然而，前景理论假设在没有学习的情况下有稳定的偏好，这一假设与动物学习理论和强化学习等替代框架不一致[3-7]。大鼠也表现出试验历史效应，这与正在进行的学习一致。根据前景理论，强化学习模型通过结果的主观值更新状态-动作值，再现了大鼠的非线性效用函数和概率加权函数，并捕获了逐次尝试的学习动态。
In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published a ground-breaking paper titled "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," which presented a behavioral economic theory that accounted for the ways in which humans deviate from economists' normative workhorse model, Expected Utility Theory [1, 2]. For example, people exhibit probability distortion (they overweight low probabilities), loss aversion (losses loom larger than gains), and reference dependence (outcomes are evaluated as gains or losses relative to an internal reference point). We found that rats exhibited many of these same biases, using a task in which rats chose between guaranteed and probabilistic rewards. However, prospect theory assumes stable preferences in the absence of learning, an assumption at odds with alternative frameworks such as animal learning theory and reinforcement learning [3-7]. Rats also exhibited trial history effects, consistent with ongoing learning. A reinforcement learning model in which state-action values were updated by the subjective value of outcomes according to prospect theory reproduced rats' nonlinear utility and probability weighting functions and also captured trial-by-trial learning dynamics.