Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling
Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling
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DOI：
10.1007/s13194-014-0105-6
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发表时间：
2015-05-01
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Intemann, Kristen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Intemann, Kristen
虽然人们普遍承认科学并非“没有”非认识价值，但对于价值可以适当发挥的作用存在分歧。一些人认为，非认知价值观可以在建模决策中发挥重要作用，特别是在解决不确定性方面（Moss和Schneider 2000; Kandlikar等人（C.R. Geoscience 337：443-455，2005）; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg（Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22（2）：111-137，2012）;货车der Sluijs（Climatic Change 75（3）359-389，2012）.另一方面，这些价值观可能（甚至是无意识地）导致偏见（Pielke 2007; Oppenhiemer et al.（Science 317：1505-1506，2007）; Bray（Environmental Science & Policy 13：340-350，2010）; Oreskes and Conway 2010）。因此，重要的是要确定何时在建模决策中诉诸非认知价值观是合法的。一种方法在这里辩护，这种价值判断是合法的，当他们促进民主认可的认识论和社会目标的研究。这一框架解释了为什么在一系列建模决策中诉诸非认知价值观是合法的，同时解决了这样的价值观的存在会导致偏见或给予科学家不成比例的权力来决定什么价值观应该得到认可的问题。
While it is widely acknowledged that science is not "free" of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties (Moss and Schneider 2000; Kandlikar et al. (C.R. Geoscience 337:443-455, 2005); Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg (Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 22(2): 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs (Climatic Change 75 (3) 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can (even unconsciously) lead to bias (Pielke 2007; Oppenhiemer et al. (Science 317:1505-1506, 2007); Bray (Environmental Science & Policy 13:340-350, 2010); Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when it is legitimate to appeal to non-epistemic values in modeling decisions. An approach is defended here whereby such value judgments are legitimate when they promote democratically endorsed epistemological and social aims of research. This framework accounts for why it is legitimate to appeal to non-epistemic values in a range of modeling decisions, while addressing concerns that the presence of such values will lead to bias or give scientists disproportionate power in deciding what values ought to be endorsed.