THE EFFECTS OF MARKET-STRUCTURE AND BARGAINING POSITION ON HOSPITAL PRICES
THE EFFECTS OF MARKET-STRUCTURE AND BARGAINING POSITION ON HOSPITAL PRICES
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DOI：
10.1016/0167-6296(92)90001-h
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发表时间：
1992-10-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
PATTISON, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
MELNICK, GA;ZWANZIGER, J;PATTISON, R
私人诊所和卫生保健组织渴望得到广泛接受，部分原因是人们相信，过剩的产能和竞争激烈的市场条件可以用来与卫生保健提供者谈判降低价格。我们调查了加州最大的PPO在不同类型市场上获得的价格。我们的研究结果表明，更大的医院竞争导致更低的价格。此外，随着一个地区的医院对PPO的重要性增加，价格也会大幅上涨。我们对定义医院地理市场的替代方法的测试表明，使用县来定义市场的常见做法导致低估了合并的价格上涨效应。
PPOs and HMOs have pined widespread acceptance due in part to the belief that excess capacity and competitive market conditions can be leveraged to negotiate lower prices with health care providers. We investigated prices obtained in different types of markets by the largest PPO in California. Our findings indicate that greater hospital competition leads to lower prices. Furthermore, as the importance of a hospital to the PPO in an area increases, the price rises substantially. Our testing of alternative methods for defining hospital geographic markets reveals that the common practice of using counties to define the market leads to an underestimate of the price-increasing effects of a merger.