The Ethics of Delusional Belief
The Ethics of Delusional Belief
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DOI：
10.1007/s10670-015-9739-9
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发表时间：
2016-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Miyazono, Kengo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bortolotti, Lisa;Miyazono, Kengo
在本文中，我们讨论了采用妄想信念的伦理问题，并将结果论和道义论的考虑应用于妄想的认知评估。妄想的特点是其认知缺陷，通常被定义为错误和非理性的信念。尽管如此，当行为者因创伤或先前逆境的影响而被负面情绪压倒时，或者当他们因超显着的经历而感到焦虑和压力时，采用妄想信念可以防止严重的认知伤害的发生。例如，妄想可以让行为者与环境保持联系，克服负面情绪和焦虑的破坏性影响。此外，如果代理人相信其他情况的能力受到损害，他们就不会因为采取自己的妄想而受到指责。有证据表明，没有任何与证据相关的行动可以反事实地导致他们相信他们通常可以采取其他行动。缺乏相信其他情况的能力，再加上其他一些条件，意味着特工们的妄想不应受到指责。对妄想认知状态的考察促使我们（1）承认认知评估的复杂性和语境性质，（2）在认识论中建立结果论框架和道义论框架之间的联系，以及（3）将认知清白的概念引入认知评估的词汇中。
In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anxiety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delusions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to (1) acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, (2) establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and (3) introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluation.