Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
复制标题
多重分配问题的策略证明、团结和一致性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Eiichi Miyagawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Klaus;Eiichi Miyagawa
抽象。我们考虑一个问题，分配不可分割的对象时，代理人可能希望消费一个以上的对象，不允许货币转移。我们感兴趣的分配规则，满足理想的性能从经济和社会的角度来看。除了防策略性和帕累托效率，我们认为一致性和两个团结的性质（控制和人口单调性）。在大多数情况下，这些属性只能由串行独裁规则来满足。
Abstract. We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and no monetary transfers are allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy desirable properties from an economic and social point of view. In addition to strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, we consider consistency and two solidarity properties (replacement-domination and population-monotonicity). In most of the cases, these properties are satisfied only by serially dictatorial rules.