Six views of embodied cognition
Six views of embodied cognition
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DOI：
10.3758/bf03196322
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发表时间：
2002-12-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Wilson, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wilson, M
新兴的具身认知观点认为，认知过程深深植根于身体与世界的相互作用。这一立场实际上包含了一些不同的主张，其中一些主张比其他主张更具争议性。本文区分并评价了以下六种主张：（1）认知是情境性的;（2）认知是时间压力的;（3）我们将认知工作卸载到环境中;（4）环境是认知系统的一部分;（5）认知是为了行动;（6）离线认知是基于身体的。其中，前三个和第五个似乎至少部分是正确的，它们的有用性最好根据其适用范围进行评估。我认为，第四种说法是有很大问题的。第六种观点在具身认知的文献中受到的关注最少，但它可能是六种观点中记录最完整、最有力的一种。
The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body's interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) offline cognition is body based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.