Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind
Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind
复制标题
与现象类的方法论遭遇
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
N. Shea
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Shea
布洛克对现象意识和通达意识的著名区分产生了大量关于两者之间假定概念联系的哲学文献。关于它们是否在任何实际情况下分开的科学文献相当少。迄今为止收集的经验证据并没有解决这个问题。有些人把这归结为对现象意识和通达意识之间关系的实证研究的根本方法论障碍。布洛克（Block，2007）提出了方法论上的困惑，并试图回答这个问题。尽管布洛克指出的证据是相关的和重要的，但本文提出了一个更系统的框架来解决这个困惑。给它一个标签，方法是把现象意识作为一种自然的意识来研究。这种方法使意识研究超越了最初识别口头报告等实例的手段，并找到了其潜在的性质。众所周知，关于潜在种类的事实可以允许识别与初始识别手段不匹配的种类的实例（cp.水的非液体样品）。本文表明，同样的方法可以部署到独立的访问意识调查现象意识。
Block’s well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness has generated a large philosophical literature about putative conceptual connections between the two. The scientific literature about whether they come apart in any actual cases is rather smaller. Empirical evidence gathered to date has not settled the issue. Some put this down to a fundamental methodological obstacle to the empirical study of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Block (2007) has drawn attention to the methodological puzzle and attempted to answer it. While the evidence Block points to is relevant and important, this paper puts forward a more systematic framework for addressing the puzzle. To give it a label, the approach is to study phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. The approach allows consciousness studies to move beyond initial means of identifying instances of the kind like verbal report, and to find its underlying nature. It is well-recognised that facts about an underlying kind may allow identification of instances of the kind that do not match the initial means of identification (cp. non-liquid samples of water). This paper shows that the same method can be deployed to investigate phenomenal consciousness independently of access consciousness.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
Clark, RE;Manns, JR;Squire, LR
通讯作者：
Squire, LR