On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel
On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel
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DOI：
10.1007/s11129-005-9003-8
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发表时间：
2006-09-01
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Ruan, Ranran
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kumar, Nanda;Ruan, Ranran
随着互联网的爆炸式发展及其所提供的覆盖范围，许多制造商通过增加在线渠道来补充其现有的零售渠道，这使他们能够直接向消费者销售产品。有趣的是，在制造商将互联网用作直接分销渠道方面，不同产品类别之间存在显著差异。本研究的主要目的是考察可能影响制造商决定用直接在线渠道补充零售渠道的战略因素。我们尤其对回答以下问题感兴趣：
（1）为什么在某些市场中，只有少数企业发现用直接互联网渠道补充其零售渠道是最优的，而其他企业却没有？
（2）直接互联网渠道起到什么战略作用（如果有的话），以及市场特征如何影响这一作用？
为了解决这些问题，我们建立了一个模型，其中有一个战略性制造商通过一个战略性零售商服务于一个市场。除了核心制造商的产品外，零售商还销售竞争制造商的产品。这个市场中的消费者分为两类。他们要么是品牌忠诚型，要么是店铺忠诚型。零售商设定零售价格和零售支持水平，这会影响制造商产品的需求。如果制造商决定用在线渠道补充零售渠道，零售商的决策反过来又取决于产品的批发价格以及互联网价格。
我们的分析表明，用在线渠道补充零售渠道的最优性以及后者所起的作用关键取决于在没有在线渠道的情况下零售商对制造商产品分配的支持水平。在没有在线渠道的情况下，零售商分配的支持水平取决于制造商产品相对于产品类别中竞争产品的零售利润率。当品牌忠诚型细分市场的规模相对于店铺忠诚型细分市场较小时，那么在没有在线渠道的情况下，制造商可以降低批发价格并提高零售支持，特别是当竞争产品的零售利润率较低时。相反，当忠诚型细分市场规模较大且竞争产品的零售利润率较高时，制造商会发现收取较高的批发价格更有利可图，即使这会导致零售商提供较低水平的支持。如果制造商决定用在线渠道补充零售渠道，一些原本会从零售商处购买的消费者可能会更愿意在线购买。我们的分析表明，当消费者对竞争渠道间价格差异的敏感度超过一定阈值时，制造商用在线渠道补充零售渠道就不是最优的。然而，这个价格敏感度阈值本身取决于产品/市场特征，这表明寻求用在线渠道补充其零售渠道的制造商在制定其最优分销策略时，不应只关注在线渠道对零售渠道构成的威胁性质。当竞争产品的零售利润率足够小时，在最优的情况下用在线渠道补充零售渠道使制造商能够进行价格歧视并提高利润。相反，当竞争产品的零售利润率足够高时，用在线渠道补充零售渠道有助于提高零售支持。我们还确定了在哪些市场条件下，有在线渠道时制造商和零售商的利润都比没有在线渠道时更高。这特别有趣，因为在线渠道与零售渠道存在竞争。
With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:(I) Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?(II) What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel.Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.