Contracting for aid
Contracting for aid
复制标题
签订援助合同
DOI：
10.1016/s0304-3878(02)00085-8
复制
发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
J. Laffont
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Azam;J. Laffont
对外援助被分析为一种合同，北方向南方提供转移，以换取减贫，这被视为一种国际公益。首先在道德风险框架内讨论了条件性问题，然后在关于南方政府利他主义程度的信息不对称的情况下讨论了条件性问题。然后，在模型中加入其他行为者，如当地非政府组织和多边援助机构。最优合同，以避免搭便车或共谋。
Foreign aid is analyzed as a contract where the North gives a transfer to the South in return for poverty reduction, regarded as an international public good. The issue of conditionality is first discussed in a moral hazard framework, and then under asymmetric information about the degree of altruism of the government of the South. Additional actors like local NGOs and multilateral aid institutions are then added to the model. The optimal contracts to avoid free-riding or collusion are then presented.