The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts
The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts
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央行透明度对指导私营部门预测的作用
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01706.x
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Marcel Fratzscher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michael Ehrmann;S. Eijffinger;Marcel Fratzscher
文献中有一个广泛的共识，即信息处理和获取的成本可能会在经济主体之间产生代价高昂的预期分歧，而中央银行可能在减少这种预期分散方面发挥核心作用。本文利用12个发达经济体中央银行透明度的大量代理数据，实证分析了提高中央银行透明度是否会降低关键经济变量专业预测者之间的差异。它发现了证据，证明央行的透明度对预测偏差具有显著而可观的影响，无论是通过宣布量化通胀目标、其他形式的沟通，还是通过发布央行的通胀和产出预测。然而，中央银行的透明度似乎也有限制，提高（经济）透明度的边际收益是递减的，鉴于我们的研究结果，普通公众通胀预期的分歧并不受本文分析的各种中央银行透明度措施的影响。
There is a broad consensus in the literature that costs of information processing and acquisition may generate costly disagreements in expectations among economic agents, and that central banks may play a central role in reducing such dispersion in expectations. This paper analyses empirically whether enhanced central bank transparency lowers dispersion among professional forecasters of key economic variables, using a large set of proxies for central bank transparency in 12 advanced economies. It finds evidence for a significant and sizeable effect of central bank transparency on forecast dispersion, be it by means of announcing a quantified inflation objective, other forms of communication, or by publishing central banks’ inflation and output forecasts. However, there also appear to be limits to central bank transparency, with decreasing marginal returns to enhancing (economic) transparency, and given our findings that disagreement among inflation expectations in the general public is not affected by the various central bank transparency measures analyzed in this paper.