A NEW EPISTEMIC UTILITY ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE
A NEW EPISTEMIC UTILITY ARGUMENT FOR THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE
复制标题
主要原则的新认知效用论证
DOI：
10.1017/epi.2013.5
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Pettigrew R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pettigrew R
吉姆·乔伊斯基于认知效用的考虑提出了概率论的论证。在最近的一篇论文中，我基于类似的考虑改编了这个论点，为概率论和主要原理提供了论据。乔伊斯的论证假设真命题的可信度越接近最大可信度越好，而假命题的可信度越接近最小可信度越好。相比之下，我在那篇论文中的论点（粗略地）假设，一个命题的可信度越接近该命题的客观机会，就越好。在本文中，我提出了概率论和主要原理的认知效用论证，该论证保留了乔伊斯的假设，而不是我在早期论文中认可的替代方案。我认为这为这些规范提供了更好的论据。
Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations. Joyce's argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in that paper assumed (roughly) that a credence in a proposition is better the closer it is to the objective chance of that proposition. In this paper, I present an epistemic utility argument for Probabilism and the Principal Principle that retains Joyce's assumption rather than the alternative I endorsed in the earlier paper. I argue that this results in a superior argument for these norms.