Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory
Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory
复制标题
康德伦理理论中的道德冲突？
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Timmermann
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Timmermann
摘要：本文探讨了康德伦理学中道德冲突的可能性。对他发表的著作中唯一明确讨论这一主题的分析证实，没有真正的道德困境的余地。冲突仅限于非决定性的义务“理由”。它们只出现在道德义务的范围内，虽然不可行，但应该被解释为代理人正确判断适用于当前情况的有效论证的结果。虽然在理论上很难确定是什么让他们中的一些人比另一些人更强大，但这些“理由”可以解释冲突案件中的实际残留，以及一种看似合理的代理人后悔形式。“应该意味着可以”的原则完好无损地存在。
Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.