Economics of Strategic Network Infrastructure Sharing: A Backup Reservation Approach
Economics of Strategic Network Infrastructure Sharing: A Backup Reservation Approach
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DOI：
10.1109/tnet.2020.3044875
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发表时间：
2021-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jing Hou;Li Sun;Tao Shu;Yong Xiao;M. Krunz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jing Hou;Li Sun;Tao Shu;Yong Xiao;M. Krunz
在向5G过渡的过程中，高昂的基础设施成本、快速推出新服务的需求以及频繁的技术/系统升级促使无线运营商考虑采用具有成本效益的网络基础设施共享（NIS），即使是在竞争对手之间，也能获得技术和市场准入。国家创新制度是一种谈判机制，其条款和条件必须在不确定的市场中根据互利原则认真确定。在这项工作中，我们提出了一个战略NIS框架之间的合同备份保留资源有限，需求不确定的小/本地网络运营商，和一个更足智多谋的运营商与过剩的容量。备份预留协议要求本地运营商（例如，运营商A）预留一定量的资源（例如，频谱），以供将来从资源拥有运营商（例如，运营商B）共享。作为回报，运营商B保证其预留资源的可用性以满足运营商A的需要。我们的特点是运营商之间的讨价还价的最优保留价格和数量，并没有考虑他们的竞争，在市场份额，分别。探讨了竞争经营者有合作动机的条件。研究了竞争强度和冗余容量对备份预留下性能的影响。我们的研究表明，NIS通过备份预留提高了资源利用率和运营商的利润，有可能支持更高的目标服务水平的最终用户。我们还发现，在某些条件下，运营商B可能仍然有动机分享其资源，即使在自己的用户的风险。
In transitioning to 5G, the high infrastructure cost, the need for fast rollout of new services, and the frequent technology/system upgrades triggered wireless operators to consider adopting the cost-effective network infrastructure sharing (NIS), even among competitors, to gain technology and market access. NIS is a bargaining mechanism whose terms and conditions must be carefully determined based on mutual benefits in a market with uncertainties. In this work, we propose a strategic NIS framework for contractual backup reservation between a small/local network operator with limited resources and uncertain demands, and a more resourceful operator with excessive capacity. The backup reservation agreement requires the local operator (say, operator A) to reserve a certain amount of resources (e.g., spectrum) for future sharing from the resource-owning operator (say, operator B). In return, operator B guarantees availability of its reserved resources to meet the need of operator A. We characterize the bargaining between the operators in terms of the optimal reservation prices and quantities with and without consideration of their competitions in market share, respectively. The conditions under which competing operators have incentive to cooperate are explored. The impact of competition intensity and redundant capacity on performance under backup reservation are also investigated. Our study shows that NIS through backup reservation improves both resource utilization and profits of operators, with the potential to support higher target service levels for end users. We also find that, under certain conditions, operator B may still have the incentive to share its resources even at the risk of impinging on its own users.