Electoral authoritarianism and political unrest
Electoral authoritarianism and political unrest
复制标题
选举威权主义和政治动荡
DOI：
10.1177/0192512115580185
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Ryan Shirah
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ryan Shirah
在过去的几十年里，选举和政党已经成为大多数专制政权的共同特征。虽然最近对混合政权的研究往往集中在独裁者如何利用这些名义上的民主制度来维持他们的非民主统治上，但有理由怀疑选举威权主义可能对政权的稳定构成特别的威胁。集体行为理论表明，选举专制政权可能面临更高水平的反政权动员，因为政党和选举可以帮助政权对手克服集体行动问题，协调他们挑战现任者的努力。一项对过去几十年136个独裁政权的分析表明，名义上实行竞争性选举的政权比不实行选举的政权的政治动荡程度更高。此外，选举年是动员反政权活动的焦点。这些发现表明，威权统治者在建立定期选举制度时面临权衡；虽然立法机构、政党和选举为现任者提供了许多好处，但它们也增加了反政府抗议和其他破坏性的大规模政治行动的频率。
Over the last several decades, elections and parties have become common features of most authoritarian regimes. While recent research on hybrid regimes has often focused on how dictators use these nominally democratic institutions to maintain their non-democratic rule, there is reason to suspect that electoral authoritarianism may pose particular threats to a regime’s stability. Theories of collective behaviour suggest that electoral authoritarian regimes might face higher levels of anti-regime mobilization since parties and elections can help regime opponents overcome collective action problems and coordinate their efforts to challenge incumbents. An analysis of 136 authoritarian regimes over the last several decades indicates that regimes that hold nominally competitive elections are characterized by higher levels of political unrest than those with no elections. Furthermore, election years serve as a focal point for mobilizing anti-regime activity. These findings imply that authoritarian rulers face a trade-off when instituting a system of regular elections; while legislatures, parties and elections provide numerous benefits to incumbents, they also increase the frequency of anti-regime protests and other disruptive, mass political action.