Fully scalable public-key traitor tracing
Fully scalable public-key traitor tracing
复制标题
完全可扩展的公钥叛徒追踪
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Yung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Y. Dodis;Nelly Fazio;A. Kiayias;M. Yung
叛逆者追踪计划是在数字内容广播的背景下打击盗版的非常有用的工具。在这种多接收者加密方案中，每个解密密钥都有指纹，当发现盗版解码器时，当局可以追踪参与其构建的用户（称为叛徒）的身份。公钥叛逆者追踪方案允许大量不可信的内容提供者使用相同的密钥集，这使得该方案具有“服务器端可伸缩性”。为了使这样的方案也是“客户端可扩展的”，即，长期存在并且可用于随时间动态变化的大量订户，实现有效的添加用户和删除用户操作是至关重要的。以前的工作公钥叛徒跟踪没有彻底解决这个动态的情况下，也没有有效的可扩展的公钥叛徒跟踪方案，允许越来越多的添加用户和删除用户的操作。为了解决这些问题，我们介绍了完全可扩展的公钥叛逆者跟踪模型，并提出了这样一个计划的第一个建设。我们的模型要求确定性的叛徒跟踪和无限数量的有效的添加用户操作和删除用户操作。一个完全可扩展的系统通过将系统的运行时间划分为多个周期，在保持高效率的同时实现了无限数量的简化。每个时期都有一个饱和水平的数量波动。当时段饱和时，系统服务器会发出有效的新时段操作，重置饱和级别。我们提出了一个正式的对抗模型，我们的系统考虑到其周期性结构，我们证明我们的建设安全，无论是对对手，试图欺骗撤销机制，以及对对手，试图欺骗叛徒跟踪机制。
Traitor Tracing Schemes constitute a very useful tool against piracy in the context of digital content broadcast. In such multi-recipient encryption schemes, each decryption key is fingerprinted and when a pirate decoder is discovered, the authorities can trace the identities of the users that contributed in its construction (called traitors). Public-key traitor tracing schemes allow for a multitude of non trusted content providers using the same set of keys, which makes the scheme “server-side scalable.” To make such schemes also “client-side scalable,” i.e. long lived and usable for a large population of subscribers that changes dynamically over time, it is crucial to implement efficient Add-user and Remove-user operations. Previous work on public-key traitor tracing did not address this dynamic scenario thoroughly, and there is no efficient scalable public key traitor tracing scheme that allows an increasing number of Add-user and Remove-user operations. To address these issues, we introduce the model of Fully Scalable Public-Key Traitor Tracing, and present the first construction of such a scheme. Our model mandates for deterministic traitor tracing and an unlimited number of efficient Add-user operations and Remove-user operations. A fully scalable system achieves an unlimited number of revocations while retaining high level of efficiency by dividing the run-time of the system into periods. Each period has a saturation level for the number of revocations. When a period becomes saturated, an efficient new-period operation is issued by the system server that resets the saturation level. We present a formal adversarial model for our system taking into account its periodic structure, and we prove our construction secure, both against adversaries that attempt to cheat the revocation mechanism as well as against adversaries that attempt to cheat the traitor tracing mechanism.