International cross-ownership of firms and strategic privatization policy
International cross-ownership of firms and strategic privatization policy
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DOI：
10.1007/s00712-014-0429-x
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发表时间：
2015-09
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Dapeng Cai;Yukio Karasawa-Ohtashiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dapeng Cai;Yukio Karasawa-Ohtashiro
我们考虑公司的国际交叉所有权如何影响与外国公司竞争的上市公司的私有化。我们发现，当企业在线性需求函数下在第三市场竞争时，外国企业的国内所有权会阻碍私有化，而国内企业的外国所有权会促进私有化。此外，在适度条件下，外国公司的国内所有权既不能使完全私有化也不能使完全国有化成为最优选择。相反，当公司竞争时，我们证明追求完全国有化总是最优的。
We consider how the international cross-ownership of firms affects the privatization of a public firm competing with foreign firms. We show that when firms compete á la Cournot in a third market under a linear demand function, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can impede privatization, whereas the foreign ownership of the domestic firm can promote privatization. Moreover, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can render neither complete privatization nor complete nationalization optimal under moderate conditions. Conversely, when firms compete á la Bertrand, we demonstrate that it is always optimal to pursue complete nationalization.