Information and the Provision of Quality Differentiated Products
Information and the Provision of Quality Differentiated Products
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信息和优质差异化产品的提供
DOI：
10.1111/j.1465-7295.2006.00033.x
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Khanna
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Keith Brouhle;M. Khanna
政府经常通过信息提供政策来克服产品质量信息的不对称。我们表明，提高消费者对商品质量的认识可以（但并不总是）鼓励企业生产具有更高质量水平的商品。即使产品质量提高了，社会福利也可能下降，因为信息的提供导致产品差异过大。我们发现，排放税和产量补贴的有效性受到消费者对产品质量的知识水平的影响，我们确定的条件下，信息提供福利增强相对于这些价格工具。(JEL L1 5，Q58）
Governments often enact information provision policies to overcome asymmetric information of product qualities. We show that increasing awareness among consumers of the quality of a good can (but will not always) encourage firms to produce goods with higher levels of quality. Even if product qualities increase, social welfare may fall as information provision results in too much product differentiation. We show that the effectiveness of emission taxes and output subsidies are affected by the level of consumer knowledge of product quality, and we identify conditions under which information provision is welfare enhancing relative to these price instruments. (JEL L1 5, Q58)