Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised
Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised
复制标题
内容和背景:并列理论的重新审视和修订
作者:
I. Rumfitt
(2) Among the things said by Galileo was that the earth moves. Reading this last sentence straight, so to speak, one is led to conclude that among the things-that-there-are are things-that-are-said, things traditionally called propositions. If that much is right, then it seems that an important part of any systematic investigation into natural language will be to determine which propositions are expressed by which declarative utterances. The thought just adumbrated is likely to be familiar, for after a period in which they were anathematized as "creatures of darkness",1 propositions have lately been enjoying a revival among the philosophically orthodox. It is no longer fashionable to dwell upon the difficulties that might attend the "straight" reading of sentence (2). Rather, attention has turned to the nature of the propositions that are there said to exist. In particular, we are asked to consider whether there are fruitful theoretical identifications to be made between propositions and either: sets of possible worlds in the style of Stalnaker; set-theoretical combinations of objects and properties in the style of Russell; or combinations of elements in some "third realm", in the style of Frege. A perusal of the writings of the most influential parties to this controversy, however, soon reveals a fundamental assumption which they share: