Preferences over Public Good, Political Delegation, and Leadership in Tax Competition
Preferences over Public Good, Political Delegation, and Leadership in Tax Competition
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对公共利益、政治授权和税收竞争中的领导力的偏好
DOI：
10.1177/1091142118817901
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
Ajay Sharma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Rupayan Pal;Ajay Sharma
领导（顺序选择）和政治授权是两种机制，建议限制“种族到底部”的税收竞争。在这篇文章中，我们分析了这两种机制结合在一起是否会导致单方面提高税收。我们表明，政治授权与税收竞争的领导不仅限制种族的底部，但也减少了过度提供公共产品的可能性。在序贯选择博弈中，只有跟随地区将征税权委托给决策者，而领导地区则没有。这抑制了税收竞争的激烈程度，限制了公共产品的供给不足。
Leadership (sequential choice) and political delegation are two mechanisms suggested to restrict “race-to-the-bottom” in tax competition. In this article, we analyze whether these two mechanisms when combined together would lead to unilaterally higher taxation or not. We show that political delegation with leadership in tax competition not only restricts race-to-the-bottom but also mitigates the possibility of overprovision of public good. In sequential choice game, only the follower region delegates taxation power to the policy maker but not the leader region. This puts a check on intensity of tax competition and restricts the under provision of public good.
区域间税收竞争、区域内政治竞争与公共产品优化供给
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
井堀 利宏
通讯作者：
井堀 利宏