An Online Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Networks
An Online Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Networks
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DOI：
10.1109/tcns.2020.2964142
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发表时间：
2020-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Shi Pu;J. J. E. Garzás-J.;Alfredo García;Shahin Shahrampour
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shi Pu;J. J. E. Garzás-J.;Alfredo García;Shahin Shahrampour
我们考虑了在受限网络上设计一个在线交易可分割资源的机制的问题。在在线环境中，参与的经纪人会随着时间的推移逐渐了解自己的边际估值。我们提出了一种在有限时间保证下实现资源有效分配的机制，即当在$T>；0$轮之后停止时，误报信息的激励有一个一致的界，即$O(\FRAC{1}{\SQRT{T}})$。我们举例说明了所提出的机制在MHA网络中的应用来优化效率，MHA网络是一种新兴的异构网络，用户可以同时连接到几种接入技术。
We consider the problem of designing an online mechanism for trading divisible resources over a constrained network. In an online setting, participating agents learn about their marginal valuations gradually over time. We propose a mechanism that implements the efficient allocation of resources with a finite-time guarantee, i.e., upon stopping after $T>0$ rounds, the incentive to misreport information has a uniform bound that is $O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}})$. We illustrate the application of the proposed mechanism to optimize the efficiency in MHA networks, an emerging type of heterogeneous networks where users can simultaneously connect to several access technologies.