Quantifying Private Benefits of Control from a Structural Model of Block Trades
Quantifying Private Benefits of Control from a Structural Model of Block Trades
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从大宗交易的结构模型量化控制权的私人利益
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1448841
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Enrique J. Schroth
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Albuquerque;Enrique J. Schroth
本文研究了大宗协议交易中控制权私人收益的决定因素。我们估计了Burkart，Gromb和Panunzi（2000）中的块定价模型，明确考虑了数据中的块溢价和块折扣。证据表明，大宗溢价或折价的发生取决于控制大宗保持器的能力，以打击潜在的要约收购目标的股票。我们发现了大量的控制权私人利益和相关的无谓损失的证据，但也有控股股东的价值创造。最后，我们提供的证据与詹森的自由现金流量假说一致。
We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premia and block discounts in the data. The evidence suggests that the occurrence of a block premium or discount depends on the controlling block holder's ability to fight a potential tender offer for the target's stock. We find evidence of large private benefits of control and of associated deadweight losses, but also of value creation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis.