Value of Storage in Distribution Grids—Competition or Cooperation of Stakeholders?
Value of Storage in Distribution Grids—Competition or Cooperation of Stakeholders?
复制标题
配电网储能的价值——利益相关者的竞争还是合作？
DOI：
10.1109/tsg.2013.2254730
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
9.6
通讯作者：
G. Smit
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Nykamp;M. Bosman;A. Molderink;J. Hurink;G. Smit
配电网中存储容量的实施被视为光伏发电机和风力发电机引起的波动馈入的集成的重要因素。然而，在大多数市场设计中，没有界定这些资产的经营责任。由于随着进一步的市场渗透，预计成本将下降，除了配电网运营商（DSO）之外，其他存储利益相关者可能对控制本地存储设备感兴趣。在本文中，不同的利益相关者（DSO和能源贸易商）的最佳存储配置文件派生的基础上的案例研究与真实的世界数据。结果表明，利益冲突的调峰波动馈入（目标的DSO，以避免增援）是阻碍了贸易公司的存储使用（利用现货市场的价差目标）显着。结果表明，不合理的高成本发生不希望的经济副作用，如果没有控制或合作机制的实施。
The implementation of storage capacities in distribution grids is seen as an important element for the integration of fluctuating feed-in caused by photovoltaic and wind generators. However, the responsibility for the operating of these assets is not defined in most market designs. Since decreasing costs are to be expected with further market penetration, next to distribution grid operators (DSO) further storage stake holders may be interested in controlling local storage devices. In this paper optimal storage profiles for different stakeholders (DSO and energy traders) are derived based on a case study with real world data. The results reveal conflicting interests-peak shaving of fluctuating feed-in (objective o the DSO to avoid reinforcements) is hampered significantly by storage usage of trading companies (objective of exploiting price spreads in the spot market). It is shown that unreasonable high costs occur with undesired economical side-effects if no control or cooperation mechanism is implemented.