Equilibrium Selection, Similarity Judgments and the "Nothing to Gain/Nothing to Lose" Effect
Equilibrium Selection, Similarity Judgments and the "Nothing to Gain/Nothing to Lose" Effect
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均衡选择、相似性判断和“一无所获/一无所失”效应
DOI：
10.1002/bdm.1772
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Jonathan W. Leland
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jonathan W. Leland
Rubinstein（1988，2003）和Leland（1994，1998，2001，2002）已经表明，基于相似性判断的选择将解释绝大多数观察到的违反预期和贴现效用的行为。在本文中，我表明，这样的判断也解释了哪些均衡将被选择在单杆游戏与多个均衡，预测的情况下，非均衡的结果可能会占主导地位，在这种游戏，并预测的情况下，具体的纯策略的结果将占主导地位的游戏没有纯策略的均衡。
Rubinstein (1988, 2003) and Leland (1994, 1998, 2001, 2002) have shown that choices based on similarity judgments will account for the vast majority of observed violations of expected and discounted utility. In this paper, I show that such judgments also explain which equilibria will be selected in single-shot games with multiple equilibria, predict circumstances in which non-equilibria outcomes may predominate in such games, and predict circumstances in which specific pure strategy outcomes will predominate in games with no pure strategy equilibria.