Advertising in Vertical Relationships: An Equilibrium Model of the Automobile Industry
Advertising in Vertical Relationships: An Equilibrium Model of the Automobile Industry
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纵向关系中的广告：汽车行业的均衡模型
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Murry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Murry
我估计了新车的需求模型以及经销商和制造商的均衡定价和广告决策。由于垂直关系中的公共物品广告外部性，经销商和制造商之间的盈余分配估计与没有广告决策的模型不同。如果两个州的特许经营法规发生变化，我会预测公司和消费者的行为。首先，允许垂直整合可以降低 20% 的零售价格和增加 30% 的广告。其次，目前制造商被限制关闭经销商，我预计在允许关闭经销商后，制造商将大幅减少品牌广告。同一品牌的其余经销商的情况可能会更糟，尽管他们面临的品牌内竞争较少。
I estimate a model of demand for new cars and equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions of dealers and manufacturers. The estimated split of surplus between dealers and manufacturers diers from a model without advertising decisions because of a public goods advertising externality within the vertical relationship. I predict firm and consumer behavior if two state franchise regulations change. First, allowing vertical integration leads to 20% lower retail prices and 30% greater advertising. Second, manufacturers are currently restricted from closing dealers and I predict that manufacturers would substantially decrease brand advertising after dealer closures are allowed. Remaining dealers of the same brand can be worse o, even though they face less intrabrand competition.