Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India
Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India
复制标题
强制政治代表权能否增加对弱势少数群体的政策影响力？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Pande
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Pande
代议制民主的一个基本前提是，所有受政策影响的人都应该在制定政策时拥有发言权。然而，对选举负责的政府制定的政策往往不能反映弱势少数群体的利益。本文利用印度各邦实行的政治保留制度的制度特征，考察授权的政治代表权在为弱势群体提供决策影响方面的作用。我发现政治保留增加了向从任务授权中受益的群体的转移。这一发现还表明，民主国家可能没有完全的政策承诺，正如在这种情况下所发现的那样。（凝胶d72， d78, h11, h50）
A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case. (JEL D72, D78, H11, H50)