Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.01.037
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发表时间：
2014-05-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Perc, Matjaz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wang, Zhen;Szolnoki, Attila;Perc, Matjaz
研究了囚徒困境和公共物品博弈中的合作演化问题，其中最初的参与者属于两个独立的结构种群。在策略进化的同时，当前效用超过阈值的玩家通过外部链接奖励给属于其他种群的玩家。然而，一旦实用程序下降到阈值以下，外部链接就会终止。因此，当前进化适应性的奖励在两个种群之间引入了随时间变化的相互依赖性。我们发现，无论进化博弈和互动结构的细节，健身和奖励的自组织产生了杰出的球员，作为合作行为的强催化剂。然而，也存在关键的效用阈值，超过该阈值，杰出的玩家不再能够渗透。然后，两个群体之间的相互依赖消失了，合作者被迫只依赖传统的网络互惠。因此，我们证明，一个简单的策略独立的奖励形式可能会显着扩大结构化人口的合作范围。在人类社会中，一个人通常是许多不同社交网络的成员，因此在直接社区之外形成联系似乎特别适用。(C)2014爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
Evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the public goods game is studied, where initially players belong to two independent structured populations. Simultaneously with the strategy evolution, players whose current utility exceeds a threshold are rewarded by an external link to a player belonging to the other population. Yet as soon as the utility drops below the threshold, the external link is terminated. The rewarding of current evolutionary fitness thus introduces a time-varying interdependence between the two populations. We show that, regardless of the details of the evolutionary game and the interaction structure, the self-organization of fitness and reward gives rise to distinguished players that act as strong catalysts of cooperative behavior. However, there also exist critical utility thresholds beyond which distinguished players are no longer able to percolate. The interdependence between the two populations then vanishes, and cooperators are forced to rely on traditional network reciprocity alone. We thus demonstrate that a simple strategy-independent form of rewarding may significantly expand the scope of cooperation on structured populations. The formation of links outside the immediate community seems particularly applicable in human societies, where an individual is typically member in many different social networks. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.