On the compatibility of a conservation ethic with biological science.
On the compatibility of a conservation ethic with biological science.
复制标题
关于保护伦理与生物科学的兼容性。
DOI：
10.1111/j.1523-1739.2006.00634.x
复制
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Sagoff,Mark
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sagoff,Mark
如果价值蕴含或暗示目的，那么自然物体（例如濒临灭绝的物种）缺乏价值，因此不值得保护，除非它们可以服务于一个目的——要么是上帝创造世界的目的（根据自然神学），要么是人类可以将其用于某些用途（根据结果主义或功利主义伦理）。如果价值需要目的，那么达尔文之后对自然神学的反驳意味着人类没有义务尊重或保护自然世界，除非这样做具有经济效率。借鉴加尔文主义神学中解释和交流之间的区别，我认为价值并不意味着目的。自然的表达、审美或交流方面可能是有价值的，或者赋予自然物体以价值，除了这些物体可能服务的任何用途或目的之外。解释和交流之间的关键区别——一个是科学的，另一个是美学的——为保护自然世界的义务提供了理由，这可能会吸引信仰团体的成员、生物学家和其他科学家。这种方法还有助于解决一些学者在确定性生物科学与保护主义伦理之间的关系中看到的“潜在的不一致”。
If value entails or implies purpose, it follows that natural objects (e.g., endangered species) lack value and thus cannot be worth protecting except for a purpose they may serve—either the end for which God created the world (according to natural theology) or some use to which human beings may put them (according to a consequentialist or utilitarian ethic). If value requires purpose, the refutation of natural theology after Darwin implies that humanity has no obligation to respect or preserve the natural world except insofar as it is economically efficient to do so. Drawing on the distinction between explanation and communication found in Calvinist theology, I argue that value does not entail purpose. The expressive, aesthetic, or communicative aspects of nature may be valuable or endow natural objects with value apart from any use or purpose these objects may serve. The crucial distinction between explanation and communication—one scientific, the other aesthetic—offers a rationale for an obligation to protect the natural world that may appeal to members of faith communities and to biologists and other scientists. This approach also helps resolve the “lurking inconsistency” some scholars see in the relationship between a deterministic biological science and a conservationist ethic.